Safety cases are now regularly used to communicate the argument about the achievement of acceptable levels of safety for safety critical systems. Increasingly, safety standards such as Defence Standard 00-56 [6] require the scope of the safety case to cover not only the development of the system, but also operating and maintenance through life, including decommissioning. This involves two dimensions of safety case management: safety case development and safety case maintenance.
Introduction
A safety argument explains how the available evidence supports the claim that the system in question meets its safety requirements. The safety argument should communicate assurance regarding the entire lifecycle of the system, including decommissioning. This involves managing changes that will take place throughout the system lifecycle, which inevitably will affect parts of the reasoning that constitutes the safety case. Consequently, it may compromise the validity of the argument that the safety case communicates, resulting in changes in the argument structure. The safety case should be able to maintain the degree of assurance of the safety claims of the system dealing with:
• Reuse of a certified COTS. Use of pre-certified COTS may provide advantages over the effort and cost of developing bespoke solutions. Often, COTS are accompanied by evidence supporting claims about their operation, which will need to be integrated to the system's existing safety case.
• Obsolescence of components or subsystems will force developers to offer alternatives for specific parts of the system. These parts may have a different operational behaviour, and development or testing regimes.
• Upgrades as part of an ongoing process of perfective and corrective maintenance. System updates may invalidate the reasoning and supporting evidence that existed in the system's original safety case.
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is a popular means of representing the underlying argument of a safety case -and can be used to create a compositional safety case. By creating argument modules that focus on a particular aspect of the system, potential changes should affect only the relevant argument modules, minimising the impact of change. Moreover, referencing other argument modules, GSN allows the addition of arguments about aspects of the changing part of the system; hence maintaining the degree of assurance of the overall safety case.
Degree of assurance in safety cases
The overall purpose of a safety case is to communicate an argument capturing the position of achievement of acceptably safe system operation. The argument is supported by evidence that demonstrates that its (argument) claims are true. It is important that adequate evidence supports the argument. Traditionally, (process based) standards such as the IEC 61508, the UK Defence Standard 00-55 [5] and the DO-178B, have a predetermined set of activities (and associated evidence), which, when followed by the system developers, are considered to sufficiently support a claim about the acceptable safety of a system. This approach is presently considered to incubate a number of challenges in terms of the confidence with which a position regarding the system is communicated [2] . UK Def Stan 00-56 issue 4 requires that "the quantity and quality of the evidence shall be commensurate with the potential risk posed by the system and the complexity of the system" [6] . As stated in Def Stan 00-56, sufficiency of available evidence is not only related to quantity. There are a number of other attributes, which determine the quality of the association between the supported position of the argument and the evidence. Weaver [8] presents a framework identifying how the quality of evidence contributes to the assurance of the overall argument. Moreover, he states that the correct balance depends on the suitability of evidence, which is based on how well the evidence assures the claims of the safety case. Assurance is not expressed in definite terms. The degree of assurance depends on subjective evaluation of its contributing attributes. For example, it is common that the trustworthiness of evidence cannot be measured. Nevertheless a process (producing evidence), which has been used in a period of years, and many developers could be justifiably considered as being 'highly trustworthy'. Similarly evidence can be considered more trustworthy depending on the type of the analysis method used. For example, formal methods evidence is considered highly trustworthy.
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No independence Figure 1 : A potential safety case architecture and system changes.
Introducing a change to the design can affect the assurance of the argument even in the case when the argument structure remains valid. For example, outsourcing the generation of evidence (i.e. testing) to an independent company is not uncommon in order to reduce cost, or to remove potential bias. In this case the argument would not undergo any structural changes. However, the trustworthiness of the evidence could potentially be challenged, since factors such as the rigour of the followed process and the competency of the personnel will change. Similarly, the other attributes of assurance can be affected by a change. An example when relevance is compromised is with the use of a COTS component that has been tested to a narrower range of values than the associated safety case claim suggests.
Rectifying assurance in the presence of a change would require additional support to the affected part. Recovering from the impact of change can be achieved by referencing argument modules that present the reasoning concerning the affected argument. For example, additional arguments may be needed to communicate compliance to a certain 'trusted' process. Moreover, justification can be associated with specific individual arguments, communicating the trustworthiness of the available evidence (e.g. by appeal to competence of the personnel). This way, a 'compositional' safety case is created comprising of multiple individual arguments. Using GSN, a compositional safety case can be created using the modular argumentation extensions.
Compositional safety cases using GSN
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [4] provides a framework (consisting of a notation and method) that can be used to capture and graphically represent any argument. GSN has become an increasingly popular means of capturing the argument of a safety case. Often, when establishing a case there is a need to reuse arguments that are either:
• Generalised argument approaches, whose concepts apply irrespective of a particular system and applicable context. For example, arguing about mitigation of identified hazards is a very common argument used in the reasoning of the majority of safety cases.
• Context dependent but cohesive and reusable arguments.
For example an argument about a component, sub-system or COTS component, that can be integrated to the reasoning of the safety case of any system.
Two GSN extensions offer provisions for reusing arguments; patterns and modular argumentation. Patterns provide the concepts to capture a generalised argument. Instantiating the argument for a particular context (i.e. the system in question) will systematically guide the developers through the considerations of the argument (e.g. the particular hazards for the system). Modular GSN extensions allow cohesive arguments (and evidence) to be captured as argument modules, which can be referenced from other argument modules. This results in a chain of reasoning, which consists of the linked claim structures communicated by individual argument modules. Figure 2 : An example of a compositional (dependability) case, aligned to MODAF products [1] . Figure 2 illustrates an example of a compositional case communicating assurance about the dependable behaviour of a System of Systems [1] . Argument modules have been used to 'architect' the case in line with the products of MODAF, which was the modelling framework used to capture the structures of a System of Systems. In the example, arguments about achieving the requirements identified in each MODAF product support an argument module, communicating the overall argument of acceptably dependable operation. A leaf goal of an argument module is said to be supported by contract. Safety case contracts define how the goal is substantiated and supported by goals in other argument modules. In addition to be able to associate individual arguments, modular GSN allows cross-referencing of arguments in different argument modules through 'away' GSN elements (e.g. an 'away' goal can be used to reference a claim made in another argument module). Modular arguments benefit the maintenance of the case as often a change can be contained within an argument module. When a change occurs it may only challenge parts of certain argument modules. A GSN argument can be challenged by change in the following ways:
• Change in goals that need to be supported.
• New or updated evidence.
• Change in the context of an argument.
These challenges can compromise the interface match between modules. There is another special case of mismatch at the module interfaces; this is assurance mismatch between associated goals (in different modules) [9] . For example, consider a goal within one module supporting the argument of another module with the use of a contract. Following a change, developers may have a lower degree of assurance in the claim captured by one of the goals (e.g. the supporting goal). Then the argument will need to be rectified to establish the original levels of assurance, or the requirement of a particular level of assurance of the supported goal will need to change to match that of the supporting goal.
Challenges in through-life safety assurance; an avionics example
A system with a modular design is inherently optimised to support reuse, upgrades and COTS. Consequently it would be inherently easier to create a compositional safety case for such a system architected around the individual system elements. The UK Defence Standard 00-74 [7] suggests a modular architecture for avionics, optimised to address such maintenance challenges. Figure 3 shows an overview of the suggested architecture. According to Def Stan 00-74 the architecture consists of three main layers: the applications, the operating system and the middleware layer. The three layers communicate with each other using interfaces defined in Def Stan 00-74. Each of the layers consists of a number of modules, responsible for a particular set of functions; for example, a scheduler module and a memory management module. Figure 3 : Typical modular avionics architecture proposed by Def Stan 00-74 [7] . Figure 4 illustrates an example safety case layout for a modular avionics system. The modules of the safety case are arranged according the system modules (a different approach to the safety case of figure 2, which was arranged around the organisation of the system, nonetheless presenting the same maintenance challenges). A top level argument module captures an argument about the high level safety requirements of the system. This is supported by an argument about the contribution of the system applications to overall safety. The application module in its turn is supported by argument modules about the operating system, the middleware, and the hardware platform. The operating system argument is stated in the context of a blueprint argument justifying the safe configurations of the system. Figure 4 also illustrates an example of the maintenance challenges faced during the lifecycle of the system. In the example a driver module in the middleware layer is changed (replaced with a new COTS driver). It is assumed that the new driver is accompanied with evidence (often termed a "certification pack") either produced by the COTS developer or by a third party contracted by the developer. The first repercussion of the change is apparent on the safety case by the use of new evidence. Consequently, this will affect the argument module in which the new evidence is used. Furthermore, the change may have indirect influence to the safety case of the system. In the example of figure 4 it is assumed that the (changed) driver is used by the system management module of the operating system (responsible for scheduling all the tasks).
A new driver may also affect the way it is used by the memory module, resulting in the module itself needing to adapt accordingly. This may have similar consequences on the safety case. As discussed, a change can affect a GSN argument in many ways. For example, apart from the new evidence, the context of the argument may change, as illustrated in figure 4 . It is common practice that the safety case is not produced at the end of the system development.
Safety case development involves a number of iterations and interim milestones before the final safety case and safety case reports are produced. Ideally, after the initial stages of system and safety case development stages, it is not expected that the arguments communicated by the safety case will significantly change in structure. 
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In contrast, evidence is volatile and could change frequently, as new versions of the system or different configurations become available.
Retesting the system needs to be performed along with examination of the safety case in order to identify the parts of the argument that have been affected and those that remain the same. These can include elements of different argument modules according to how evidence is used in the safety case.
Impact of change on a compositional safety case
Introducing a change to the system can affect the safety case in different degrees. There are four different categories describing the degree of impact a change on the safety case. For the purposes of the example we assume that only the evidence of the middleware argument module is affected by the introduced change. Nonetheless, any argument element may be affected by a change. The four categories of impact of change are the following:
1. Update: This category includes a change in one of the elements of the safety case (e.g. a reference to an evidence item), which does not affect the structure of the argument.
Contained:
The introduced change may result in an unsustainable argument that will need to be restructured. Despite restructuring the argument, the argument module is able to maintain its interfaces with other argument modules intact.
Reconfigurable:
This category involves changes that resulted in altering the structure of the argument to an extent that it invalidates its module interfaces. This means that the change will also propagate to the contract (module) used to interface the associations of the changed module with the rest of the safety case argument modules. Despite the fact that the interfaces are no longer valid, maintaining the case would involve restructuring the contract to provide new support to the parent goals, without changing them. This would allow absorbing the impact of the change at the contract without having to change the structure of the supported argument module. Impact of change in this category results in changing both the supporting argument module and the contract used to interface it to other modules for which it provides support.
In-the-large:
This includes changes that affect modules other than the one in which the change was introduced. In such cases the impact of the safety case maintenance process, will affect many modules and potentially the architecture of the modular safety case. When assessing the degree in which a change has impacted the safety case, consideration should be given to the references that exist between argument elements. In addition to associating argument modules, modular GSN also allows individual argument elements (e.g. a context element) to be referenced from a different argument module than the where it exists. This means that even if a change is contained within an argument module, references from other argument modules may have greater (degree of) impact on these modules. In modular GSN, the goals accessed from another argument module are denoted as public. Changes affecting public goals should also include tracking of potential changes associated with cross-references from other argument modules.
Maintaining assurance using modular arguments
Introducing a change in the safety case by changing the structure or elements of the argument, can invalidate the argument communicated by the safety case. Maintaining the safety case is an essential activity. Recovering from the challenge imposed by introduced change, and its subsequent impact on the safety case, should involve adequate measures to maintain the assurance communicated by the challenged arguments. The kind of recovery action that will be performed to maintain the safety case is related to the type of challenge. Figure 7 presents According to the actions that need to be taken for each of these issues, a process can be formulated and represented in a more rigorous manner, for example using a flow chart.
Checklists can document constraints imposed on the process (e.g. module should be tested in a specific minimum range of values -coverage attribute). The items of such a checklist can contribute to the creation of reusable argument patterns. When instantiated they result in argument modules justifying the assurance on the process (e.g. by contributing claims such as 'Coverage of testing has been preserved'). Figure 8 shows how an argument module can be used to recover from the impact of a change. A change in the system affects the assurance communicated by the argument. This will affect the relevance of the existing evidence. Introduction of the change also involves an assurance process for that change. In this case, introducing a new COTS component would involve a process establishing assurance for the operation of the new COTS component, in the context of the system. This process should adapt to allow construction of an argument, which can be associated with the claim that was affected, thus contributing to the recovery of the safety case.
Evidence constitutes a particularly volatile element of the argument. A change in the design is very likely that will affect either the evidence directly (e.g. by updating evidence), or the level of assurance offered by an item of evidence (e.g. suggests an approach to increase the ability of the safety case to contain changes on evidence. This involves separating evidence in individual modules, providing an additional 'barrier' for containing propagation of (evidence) change during the system's lifecycle. The left part of the figure shows how evidence is 'usually' linked to goals in a GSN argument. Often the link between the goal and evidence masks more logic inferences than actually depicted (albeit more often easily recognised ones), resulting in a 'cryptic' argument. This can be even more apparent using prescriptive standards, which 'impose' the evidence that will have to be collected, even if there is no accompanying rationale or justification for their generation.
The right hand side of the figure illustrates how the argument can be transformed, optimised to isolate and contain change. 
Advantages of compositional safety cases
Creation of a modular safety case can offer numerous advantages in optimising the safety case for through-life maintenance:
• Reuse of arguments. Existing arguments about modules or sub-systems of the system or the development process can be referenced from other parts of the safety case without duplication.
• Containment of impact of change. A change affecting the safety arguments can be contained within an argument, module as long as the argument module can maintain its interfaces. This involves supporting the declared public goals of the module to the same degree of assurance.
• Contracts between argument modules provide additional barrier to propagation of change if the public (crossreferenced) goals from a supporting argument have changed. Re-contracting the leaf goals of the (supported) module can maintain the assurance of the claims communicated by the goals, albeit with a different supporting argument.
• Limiting the cost of (re)generating evidence. Reuse of evidence created as part of certification packs of COTS components can be reused to provide effort and cost savings; provided the interfaces remain valid and that the certification packs offer the right assurances.
• Integration of process and product arguments. When necessary, reuse of arguments or evidence may require the appropriate assurance about the suitability and sufficiency of the provided evidence/argument. Use of process arguments can undertake this role, ensuring the correct safeguards (e.g. coverage of testing) have been applied when reusing arguments or evidence.
• Standardisation of processes. Use of (modular) process arguments can be beneficial for developers to standardise practices and processes that are considered to be suitable for system development. Such processes can result in process arguments that can be used to further support the product arguments.
Challenges using compositional safety cases
Apart from advantages, use of modular argumentation also carries with it certain challenges:
• Complexity: References between modules can add to the complexity of the overall argument, thus being potentially detrimental to its clarity (e.g. when reviewed by an independent authority). Coupling between arguments should be maintained at reasonable levels.
• Loss of uniformity, and over-specification. Often, when an argument module relates to lower levels of the system, there may be an obscure connection to the top level hazards. As a consequence, the reviewer may fail to understand how the lower level claims contribute to the safety of the system. Contracts should make clear the relationship of the referenced arguments.
Summary
The purpose of a safety case is to communicate assurance about the safety of a system in the context of its operation. Although the safety case is constructed during the development phases of the system it often needs to be maintained throughout a system's entire lifecycle until decommissioning. Inevitably during its lifecycle a system will undergo changes and upgrades, either as part of a bespoke solution or through adoption of a COTS component. Standards such as Def Stan 00-74 specify modular architectures optimised to accommodate such changes. However, a system change impacts on the structure of the safety case and the assurance communicated by it. Use of argument modularity allows the adoption of strategies that can minimise the impact of a change on a safety case.
Recovery of the safety case can involve both argument restructuring and use of additional supporting argument modules.
